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Abstract 
 
I ask where African opposition parties organize. Party-building is communicative; it involves 
persuading people to become activists. The literature suggest that opposition parties organize 
where people are receptive to their messages and build outwards from there. I study Chadema’s 
opposition party-building through site-intensive fieldwork. Chadema organized primarily in such 
receptive areas, but also in four unreceptive constituencies. I use these deviant constituencies to 
refine the literature. Prior theory neglects the heterogeneity of party-building. I decompose party-
building into three modes: by touring leaders, branches and concentrating leaders. Concentrating 
leaders dedicate their organizing to single places. They employ small rallies which afford 
interactive, individualized and iterative communication. This personalized communication enables 
them to overcome initial unreceptiveness to their messages. I conclude that opposition parties can 
organize in unreceptive areas, but only through the personalized methods of these “lone 
organizers.” Altogether, I show how and through whom opposition parties organize in hostile 
environments. 
 
Key words: Opposition parties, party-building, personalized communication, political geography, 
African politics 
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African opposition party-building follows a common geographic vector. Organizing involves 
persuading citizens to found branches and run them. The literature suggests that citizens will be 
receptive to such persuasion insofar as they already support the party, agree with it and trust its 
messengers (Zaller, 1992; Iyengar and Simon, 2000). However, it also indicates that citizens who 
are thus receptive to opposition messages are concentrated in areas which are urban, populated by 
parties’ constructed co-ethnics, or home to pre-existing party branches (Horowitz, 2016; Harding 
and Michelitch, 2019; Letsa, 2019). Therefore, opposition party organizing begins in such receptive 
areas and grows outwards from them like ink blots spilled on paper. This creates a quandary for 
opposition parties. Local branches help parties to shape opinion and become popular (Letsa, 2019; 
Paget, 2019a), but opposition parties can most feasibly establish them where they are already most 
popular and agreed with. Therefore, in one respect, opposition parties can best organize where 
they least need to. 
 
Tanzania’s leading opposition party is Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema or “The Party 
of Democracy and Development”). Between 2007 and 2015, it organized at an incredible scale 
(Paget, 2019a). Largely, it followed the spatial organizational trajectory described above. However, 
it also established local branches in three constituencies in and one near what it calls “the Central 
Zone”, a ruling party stronghold beyond Chadema’s organizational frontier (Collord, 2015). This 
was among the most hostile environments in which Chadema could have organized by location, 
demography and electoral history. These are instances of opposition organizing which defied 
Chadema’s national strategy and the constraints on opposition organizing indicated by the 
literature. I treat these clusters of Chadema party-building as deviant cases (two cases, two shadow 
cases). 
 
I argue that Chadema organized in those deviant constituencies by employing a particular mode 
of organization. I define party-building - or synonymously, party-organizing - as the establishment 
of party organs such as branches in places in which they were previously absent, and the 
concomitant recruitment of members as activists for those organs. I critique the literature and 
suggest that it under-theorizes party-building. It neither specifies who builds the party, nor how 
they do so. One notable exception is that the literature singles out MPs as inimical to opposition 
party-building. It suggests that they develop patron-client relations with activists which undermines 
party cohesion (Rakner and van de Walle, 2009; Cooper, 2014).  
 
I distinguish between three modes of party-building by the actors involved and the practices or 
methods they employ: organizing by (1) touring leaders, (2) branches and (3) concentrating leaders 
or “lone organizers” who focus on one area or constituency. I argue that each of these modes 
enables party-building in unreceptive or “hostile” areas to different degrees. The enabling power 
of each mode turns on two features: the personalization of party-building practices and mobility 
of the organizers. First, opposition organizing in hostile areas is more effective when it involves 
personalized methods of communication. These interactive, individualized and iterative methods 
help opposition parties to recruit activists in hostile environments more than impersonalized 
methods do. Second, organizers can operate in hostile areas far from party’s branches only insofar 
as they are mobile. 
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Each mode of organizing is associated with different combinations of these characteristics. 
Touring leaders are mobile, but they use impersonalized methods. Branches use personalized 
methods, but they are immobile. This makes organizing by concentrating leaders is unique. This 
mode alone combines the mobility and personalized methods which enable opposition organizing 
in hostile areas. I trace the modes of party-building that Chadema employed in Tanzania. I find 
that it organized in receptive areas through touring leaders and branches, but that it organized in 
the Central Zone through the personalized party-building of a small group of lone organizers. 
Therefore, I conclude that opposition parties can organize in hostile areas, but only through the 
concentrating leaders. A corollary of this argument is that lone organizers like MPs, far from 
undermining party-building, can be vehicles for it. 
 
Thereby, I use this deviation of Chadema from the literature - in organizing in the Central Zone - 
to refine the literature on party-building in sub-Saharan Africa. Asking “where did Chadema 
organize?” leads me to the further question: “how and through whom did Chadema organize 
here?” This serves as a lens onto the equivalent wider question: “how and through whom do 
opposition parties organize in sub-Saharan Africa?” Altogether, I do not make claims about the 
causal determinants of opposition organizing. Instead, I contribute to the literature by make claims 
about the practices and actors through which they organize. 
 
My study of these four deviant cases is nested within my study of Chadema as an extreme case of 
opposition organizing. The scale of Chadema’s organizing made its party-building practices 
particularly pronounced, and this aided my concept-development and data-generation. I used my 
research to develop theory (George and Bennett, 2005). I did not fix data collection procedures 
that would standardize the operationalization of variables in advance. Instead, I construct variables 
qualitatively in the text (George and Bennett, 2005, 28). This was a deliberate choice to preserve 
the exploratory character of my research. This enabled me to develop a grounded theory (Charmaz, 
2006). As I do not make inferences about causal determinants of party organizing, I do not employ 
a process tracing methodology as defined in the literature. However, I do nonetheless trace 
processes, in particular organizational practices, and I generate substantive empirical evidence to 
demonstrate that those practices were at work.  
 
To generate that theory and evidence, I conducted eight months of field research between January 
and December 2015. In this article, I draw primarily on four forms of field research. First, I 
interviewed 11 past and present Chadema Central Committee members and six further high-level 
officials. Second, I interviewed 14 Chadema parliamentary candidates (of which, five Central 
Committee members), including four who ran in the Central Zone. Third, I visited 35 Chadema 
organs at the district, ward, branch and foundation levels, primarily in eight constituencies spread 
evenly across four regions: Mwanza, Singida, Dodoma and Mbeya regions. Fourth, I was a latent 
participant observer of the 2015 election campaign. There, I witnessed some of the party-building 
methods which had been employed in the preceding eight years. I attended 42 rallies, including 34 
parliamentary candidate rallies; and I accompanied five canvassing trips. This diversity of evidence 
is crucial for both the qualitative construction of variables and the generation of evidence about 
organizing practices. First, my multiple sources of evidence enabled me to fill gaps left by any 
individual sources. Second, this variety of sources enabled me to verify the claims of individuals. 
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Tanzania is ruled by an electoral-authoritarian regime (Paget, 2017). I anonymize all interviewees 
save those whose political views are publicly known to protect them from the state. Quotations 
are expressed in English; all quotes originally given in Swahili were translated professionally. I was 
aided by research assistants who wish to remain anonymous.  
 
Where opposition parties organize 
 
Many opposition parties in sub-Saharan Africa are organizationally weak (Rakner and van de Walle, 
2009). In particular, they lack local presence (Randall and Svåsand, 2002; Krönke, Lockwood and 
Mattes, 2020). This places them in stark contrast to ruling parties which, with the benefit of 
incumbent largess and state infrastructure, often achieve widespread organizational presence 
(Randall and Svåsand, 2002). That opposition organizational weakness varies sub-nationally; most 
opposition parties have local presence in some places, but not in many others (Horowitz, 2016; 
Letsa, 2019; McLellan, 2020). Nonetheless, most studies analyze opposition organizing at the 
national-level.1 This is a significant limitation of the literature, which consequently only identifies 
national-level determinants of opposition party-building (LeBas, 2011; Riedl, 2014; Paget, 2019a). 
Consequently, spatial patterns of opposition organizing have become the subject of recent research 
(Bob-Milliar, 2019; Paller, 2019; McLellan, 2020). I theorize where parties organize by building 
logically on the implications of adjacent literatures. 
 
Party-building involves recruiting activists, either party members-as-activists or extra-party 
activists. Therefore, party-building is a communicative practice; more precisely, it is a persuasive 
one. I do not use the term “persuasion” and “mobilization” in the sense fixed in the political 
science literature of “changing policy preferences” and “increasing turnout”. Following the 
political communication literature, I recognize that parties change opinions and behavior by 
informing, priming, and framing too (Iyengar and Simon, 2000; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). 
I draw on this broader conception of “persuasion.” Below, I use “persuasion” as a shorthand for 
“convincing people to become party activists through communication.” 
 
The most common distinction drawn in African electoral political geography is between party 
“swing” and “core” areas (Horowitz, 2016). This distinction is pertinent in the study of campaign 
strategy because it focuses on the current levels of party support relative to rival parties. Therefore, 
it bears on the probability that a marginal increase in campaign effort will tip party support into a 
plurality. However, it is not the most analytically incisive distinction if studying party organizing, 
when the most pertinent question is the effect of marginal organizational effort, irrespective of 
levels of prior organization relative to rival party organization. Therefore, I develop an alternate 
distinction between “receptive” and “hostile” areas below. 
 
The comparative literature shows that the effects of party-citizen political communication are 
mediated by several factors, chiefly the citizen’s prior support for the party, congruence between 
the party’s message and the citizens’ prior beliefs, and the citizen’s trust in the medium (Zaller, 
 
1 This is despite the fact that many studies analyze opposition popularity at the subnational-level 
(for example Wahman, 2015, 2016; Arriola, Dow and Letsa, 2019; Letsa, 2019). 
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1992; Iyengar and Simon, 2000). In other words, people are more receptive to messages insofar as 
they already support the party, they agree with its messages and they trust the messenger. Insofar 
as an area is populated by people that meet any and each of these three criteria, it will be receptive 
to party messages and be a “receptive area”. Insofar as it is not thus populated it will be a “hostile 
area”. 
 
The Africanist literature finds that ruling party support is national (Wahman, 2015); it is widely 
dispersed and present in all areas. Therefore, even when incumbents lack prior organizational 
presence, citizens will be receptive to their messages and so they will be able to organize across 
space. By contrast, the same literature suggests that people who are receptive to opposition 
messages are geographically concentrated. Specifically, it suggests that citizens will be receptive to 
opposition messages in three non-exclusive types of location: co-ethnic areas, urban areas and 
areas where the party is already organizationally present. 
 
First, ethnicity is a significant determinant of party support in sub-Saharan Africa (Cheeseman and 
Ford, 2007; Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen, 2012), albeit contested (Harding and Michelitch, 2019). 
Opposition party support is especially mono-ethnic (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007), and 
concentrated geographically (Wahman, 2015). Therefore, people who share the ethnic identity with 
which an opposition party is associated (co-ethnics) will be more receptive to its messages, other 
things being equal. 
 
Second, research shows that opposition parties and urban residents share policy positions. 
Opposition parties choose policies close to those of urban residents (Resnick, 2013). Equally, 
urban residents hold opinions about liberal democracy (Letsa, 2019) which incline them to 
opposition parties (Bleck and van de Walle, 2013). Research, which is contested (Nathan, 2019), 
suggests that urban residents’ support for political parties is guided more by these programmatic 
considerations. Urban residents are, variously, more critical, more exposed to media, better 
educated, less guided by ethnicity, less partisan, and free to choose between competing clientelist 
patrons (Resnick, 2013; Macdonald, 2018; Harding and Michelitch, 2019). Finally, urban residents 
are more likely to support opposition parties (Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen, 2012; Resnick, 2013). 
Altogether, urban residents will be more receptive to its messages, other things being equal. 
 
Third, people located near opposition party organs will be exposed to opposition messages and by 
degrees adopt partisan opinions (Letsa, 2019). They will also become familiar with opposition 
activists. Therefore, they too will be more receptive to opposition messages. A corollary of these 
claims is that opposition parties will concentrate their party-building in these receptive areas, where 
they will be most effective. Therefore, they will organize outwards from these areas, expanding 
their party territory by advancing an organizational frontier. While this theory is untested, this 
spatial pattern of opposition organizational presence is documented or otherwise treated as an 
empirical fact in several studies (Wahman, 2015; Horowitz, 2016; Paget, 2019a; McLellan, 2020). 
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How and through whom opposition parties organize 
 
This forms a starting-point for my theory-development. However, this starting point does not 
differentiate between who organizes or how they do so. Neither does the extant literature. It 
theorizes organizing practices through metaphors of “investment” and “construction” enacted 
simply by “parties”.2 This is a shortcoming in the theorization of party-building which 
oversimplifies causal claims. A partial exception to this pattern is the study of MPs. The literature 
claims that MPs often frustrate party-building. They foster relationships with citizens based on 
clientelism or charisma which are independent of their membership of parties and erode 
opposition strength (Randall and Svåsand, 2002; Rakner and van de Walle, 2009; Cooper, 2014). 
This suggests that MPs undermine opposition organizing. 
 
I refine the literature by disaggregating party-building into three modes. Each of these modes 
corresponds to a set of actor-roles and practices. Each of these modes are “grounded” concepts 
developed from the insights of my field research (Charmaz, 2006). 
 
1. Organization by touring leaders involves a schedule of rallies. Speakers at these rallies draw 
people to attend and recruit them as members. A follow-up team contacts the new 
members, selects a provisional committee from among them and renders it a party organ. 
This involves producing rallies without the help of local branches who normally complete 
the accompanying labor-intensive tasks (Paget, 2020). Therefore, this mode of party-
building is typically conducted by senior politicians with the fame, persuasive ability or 
resources to make rallies work in the absence of branches. It is relatively labor-light to 
execute in one place, and so can be conducted by a small group of such politicians across 
localities through a national tour. 
 
2. Organization by branches involves street-level action. Campaigners convene small rallies 
and indoor meetings, canvass and mount posters. Thereby, they recruit members. They 
assign these members to an existing local organ, or they select a provisional committee 
from among them and render that committee a party organ. This mode of party-building 
is labor-intensive. That heavy labor demand is met by networks or party-aligned activists 
who are normally locally-based. They often take the form of party members in pre-existing 
nearby local organs such as branches. Equally, they can take the form of extra-party 
associations and assemblages (Nielsen, 2012). 
 
3. Organization by concentrating leaders involve street-level action too. Lone organizers 
convene small rallies and indoor meetings. They recruit members through this action, form 
a provisional committee and render it a party organ. This mode of party-building is labor-
intensive. Lone organizers meet that heavy labor demand through the commitment of large 
amounts of personal time, making organizing a full-time endeavor over months or years. 
Equally, they lighten this load through their superior persuasive ability or the expenditure 
 
2 A notable exception is Adrienne LeBas, who shows that trade unions organized for the Zimbabwean 
opposition (LeBas, 2011: 426). However, strong and politicized unions are unusual (Randall and Svåsand, 
2002), and union-led party-building is atypical. 
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of resources. Typically, this mode is carried-out by senior politicians who concentrate on 
building the party in one place. Often, this politician is an aspirant for elected office, such 
as a prospective parliamentary or councilor candidate. 
 
Therefore, party-building is heterogeneous; it takes many forms. This variety in party-building has 
ramifications for where parties can build, which turn on two features of each mode of organization: 
the mobility of the organizers and the personalization of communication methods. Mobile actors, 
thus defined, are able to organize far from the party’s pre-existing structures. Immobile party 
actors, by definition, are not thus able. 
 
I defined party organizing above as the establishment of branches and the recruitment of activists. 
I asserted that it is achieved through communication, whereby people are persuaded to become 
party activists. To define communication as personalized and impersonalized, I draw on the three 
features of communication enumerated in the seminal work of Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson 
and Hazel Gaudet (1948): (1) interactivity, (2) individualization and (3) iteration. Here defined, 
communication is interactive when it is conversational, when participants take turns, change roles 
and respond to each others’ messages (Isotalus, 1998). It is individualized when the content of the 
message is tailored by the speaker to individual listeners rather than a large audience (Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson and Gaudet, 1948). It is iterative when there are successive episodes of communication 
between the same persons. 
 
Lazarfeld, Berelson and Gaudet generate these features to distinguish between face-to-face and 
mediated communication, which they argue do and do not bear these characteristics respectively. 
Recent work distinguishes between modes of face-to-face communication and argues that 
canvassing bears these characteristics while large rallies do not (Paget, 2019b). Following this work, 
I define organizing as personalized insofar as it involves (1) interactive, (2) individually-tailored 
and (3) iterative communication (Nielsen, 2012). Canvassing and rallies afford such personalized 
organizing insofar as they are small. I define organizing as impersonalized insofar as it involves (1) 
one-way, (2) uniform and (3) single-shot communication. Rallies afford only impersonalized 
organizing insofar as they are large. Following the literature, I stipulate that the effects of 
impersonalized organizing are mediated by peoples’ receptiveness, as defined above, more than 
the effects of than personalized organized (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1948; Nielsen, 2012). 
Therefore, personalized organizing better enables opposition parties to organize beyond receptive 
areas. 
 
In political science, especially Africanist political science, “personalized” has been used as a 
synonym for “patrimonial” or “neo-patrimonial”. This refers to a relationship between a politician 
and a citizen as the ties between a patron and a client based on either charisma or material 
exchange. Personalized communication as I define it is distinct from these meanings of 
“personalized” because it necessarily involves persuasion rather than material exchange, and 
because it involves mobilization of activists for a party, rather than an individual. 
 
These organizational modes are not mutually exclusive; each can be employed alongside the others 
as well as independent of the others. Nonetheless, of the three modes of party-building described 
above, only one enables opposition organizing in hostile areas. Touring leaders are mobile. 
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However, they use impersonalized methods, and this blunts their ability to organize in hostile 
areas, especially because people who are unreceptive to a party’s message are less likely to attend 
their rallies (Paget, 2019b). Party branches use personalized methods but lack the mobility to 
operate far from their locations in receptive areas. By contrast, organization by concentrating 
leaders combines the mobility of leaders with the personalized methods of branches. Therefore, 
they enable party-building in unreceptive areas which are remote from the party’s organizational 
territory. Far from frustrating party-building, actors like MPs can be crucial to it. Altogether, I 
contend that opposition parties can organize in unreceptive areas, if lone organizers dedicate 
extensive time to party-building using personalized methods. 
 
In the following sections of this paper, I substantiate these categories and this argument through 
a study of Chadema’s organizing. In next section, I enrich these concepts. I present Chadema’s 
party-building in urban and co-ethnic areas receptive to its message. I show that it organized in 
these areas primarily through touring leaders and branches. In the subsequent section, I trace how 
concentrating leaders built the party. From this evidence, I conclude that Chadema organized in 





In 2006, Chama cha Mapinduzi’s (CCM, “The Party of the Revolution”) organization was 
unparalleled. It had, and has, a nation-spanning hierarchy of branches (Morse, 2014) and remained 
an exemplar dominant party (Randall and Svåsand, 2002; Makulilo, 2012; Macdonald, 2018). By 
contrast, Chadema was poorly organized (Max Mmuyu and Chaligha, 1994). By 2015, the 
organizational landscape was transformed. Chadema claimed that it had acquired a structure of 
51,947 foundations and 16,359 branches (Slaa, 2014); these figures were indicatively supported by 
post-election survey data, which showed that Chadema canvassed as many or more people than 
CCM (Paget, 2019a). They have continued this party-building since then (Kwayu, 2021). In 
Chadema’s organizational expansion from 2007 to 2015, three modes of party-building can be 
traced. In this section, I introduce two of them. 
 
Chadema’s leadership raised money to fund a long period of party-building (Paget, 2019a). In 2007, 
Chadema initiated a party-building program called Operation Sangara (Babeiya, 2011). It dispatched 
a motorcade upon a regional tour, containing the party’s best-known leaders. This convoy 
convened successive rallies intended “to introduce the party to the public…” (Kigaila, 2015). 
However, while imparting their messages to citizens, Chadema also recruited members. Then-
Youth Wing Secretary-General Deogratias Munishi described that at rallies “You recruit members. 
You organize them to elect their leaders” (Munishi, 2015). Benson Kigaila, Head of Chadema’s 
Directorate for Organization, Training and Zonal Administration, recalled that where 
organizational initiative was lacking, the convoy would provide further direction ad hoc (Kigaila, 
2015). While these practices were organizational, they were nonetheless impersonalized. They 
involved large rallies which were often stand-alone events with little follow-up. 
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This party-building focused on specific areas. Chadema takes ten self-defined zones,3 rather than 
Tanzania’s 31 administrative regions4 as its primary geographic referents (Kigaila, 2015; Lissu, 
2015; Munishi, 2015; Chadema, 2020). Figure 1 displays a labelled map of Tanzania’s regions, 
color-coded by the zones into which Chadema sorts them. I omit Zanzibar labels and coding for 
simplicity of presentation. In 2007, Chadema leaders said that they were best organized in two 
such zones. The first was the Coast Zone, which contains Dar es Salaam where its national 
headquarters were based (Baregu, 2015; Kimesera, 2015a; Munishi, 2015). The second was the 
Northern Zone, especially Kilimanjaro Region and parts of neighboring Arusha Region (Kimesera, 
2015a; Mrema, 2016). Chadema disavows ethnic politics, but many of its leaders hail from 
Kilimanjaro and Arusha Regions and nearby; both Chagga ethnicity and a partially-constructed 
regional “Northerner” identity have been sometimes associated with Chadema (Macdonald, 2018). 
Therefore, Chadema leaders said that they were best organized and most popular in the primary 




3 Eight in mainland Tanzania, two in Zanzibar. 
4 The 31st region, Songwe, was added in 2016. 
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5 Original map shape file publicly available from World Bank (World Bank, 2017). 
6 Tanzania was divided into 30 regions in 2015, five in asymmetrically federated Zanzibar, not shown here. 
A 31st region (Songwe) was added in 2016. 
7 Two further zones in asymmetrically federated Zanzibar - Pemba and Unguja Zones – are not shown 
here. 
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In Operation Sangara, Chadema focused initially on Mwanza Region in Victoria Zone, and the 
surrounding Serengeti Zone (Babeiya, 2011). Elite interviewees attest to this (Kigaila, 2015; Kabwe, 
2018) and I verified their claims in my ground research. Chadema members and low-level 
officeholders in Mwanza reported joining Chadema in 2010 (Anonymous, 2015o; Fieldnotes, 
2015d), some specifically after attending Operation Sangara rallies (Anonymous, 2015v). 
Subsequently, Chadema turned principally to what it calls the Nyasa Zone, especially Mbeya 
Region, and the Northern Zone (Kigaila, 2015; Kimesera, 2015b; Munishi, 2015). Chadema 
members in Mbeya Region reported joining or first running for party positions during Operation 
Sangara (Anonymous, 2015h; Anonymous, 2015u). After Dar es Salaam, the largest cities in 
Tanzania are Mwanza, Arusha and Mbeya, located in the Victoria Zone, Northern Zone and Nyasa 
Zone respectively (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012).8 Therefore, in accordance with the 
literature, Chadema organized outwards from urban centers (Babeiya, 2011), in a co-regional area, 
and outwards from a co-ethnic area. 
Subsequently, Chadema refined their party-building practices. This involved operations closer to 
the ground, in which they concentrated further on instituting party organs. Kigaila described the 
revised method: 
We had a team doing the preparation… They [politicians] do a rally… you have 
the training session for members. After the training, you have the election for 
the leaders… [then] the leaders will be trained (Kigaila, 2015). 
These sequential preparations, rallies, trainings and elections made the organizing more 
personalized, as defined above; it was iterative and involved increasingly smaller groups where 
interaction and individualization became possible. Chadema called this program Movement for 
Change (M4C) or Chadema ni Msingi (“Chadema is the Foundation”) interchangeably. 
 
In M4C, Chadema returned to and built on its organizational gains in Victoria, Serengeti, Northern 
and Nyasa Zones. Consistent with the theory described above, it also employed these more 
personalized party-building methods to organize in less receptive areas. It concentrated on four 
new regions (Munishi, 2015): Mtwara, Lindi, Morogoro and Iringa. Chadema had little prior 
organizational presence in these regions beyond Iringa Town (Kigaila, 2015; Kilimwiko, 2015). 
Moreover, they lacked the urbanity and proximity to ethnic strongholds that previous target areas 
had enjoyed. Chadema hoped to capture discontent related to perceived exploitation of natural gas 
in Mtwara and cashew-nut farmers in Lindi (Kilimwiko, 2015). Therefore, these areas may have 
been somewhat receptive to Chadema’s organizational message. Nonetheless, Chadema’s leaders 
organized there partly because the refinement of their touring leader party-building described 
above made it more personalized. 
 
Alongside this organizing by party leaders, Chadema branches organized. Some did this of their 
own initiative between 2007 and 2010. However, branch party-building became more frequent and 
routine between 2011 and 2015 as a second prong of M4C. Chadema dispensed instructions to 
every branch through a train-the-trainers program which is described further elsewhere (Paget, 
2019a). The trainers gave branches the following instructions: “get us new membership” (Slaa, 
2015). Then-parliamentary candidate Susan Kiwanga described that how branch organizing 
 
8 Save Dodoma, the political capital, which remained a CCM stronghold. 
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worked. Ward-level staff were trained to visit “villages or streets and gather people, gather their 
neighbors. Register them…People buy cards.” (Kiwanga, 2015) 
 
I documented this organizing by branches. Consistent with Kiwanga’s description, they recruited 
members by canvassing (Anonymous, 2015i; Anonymous, 2015b), convening public meetings, 
convening private indoor-meetings (Anonymous, 2015b; Anonymous, 2015d), mounting posters 
(Fieldnotes, 2015b) and addressing street-corner conversation groups called vijiwe (Anonymous, 
2015v, Anonymous, 2015r). I witnessed that these practices involved personalized communication: 
namely, organizers visited the same groups repeatedly and engaged in small-group conversations 
which were individualized and interactive. For example, as I accompanied Chadema canvassers, I 
learnt how they spoke to people. I witnessed them engage people in steady-paced conversations 
(Fieldnotes, 2015b; Fieldnotes, 2015c; Fieldnotes, 2015d). I observed them altering (or tailoring) 
the content of their messages (Fieldnotes, 2015b; Fieldnotes, 2015c; Fieldnotes, 2015d). Lastly, I 
noticed that often, canvassers knew the people they visited and had visited them before, iteratively 
(Fieldnotes, 2015c; Fieldnotes, 2015d). 
 
To summarize, my field research indicates that, consistent with the literature, Chadema focused its 
organizing in receptive areas. The scale of their organization achievement is illustrated by data 
from Mwanza Region. By 2015, Chadema had 171 foundations in Ilemela District alone 
(Anonymous, 2015m) which I saw first-hand (Anonymous, 2015b; Anonymous, 2015d; 
Anonymous, 2015i; Anonymous, 2015v). It had a further 252 foundations spread across the 
adjacent Magu and Sengerema Districts (Anonymous, 2015t). 
 
However, elsewhere, Chadema had acquired less organizational reach. Kigaila’s assessment was 
that in 2010 “The Central [Zone] was weak; Singida, Dodoma, Morogoro” (Kigaila, 2015). By 
2015, Chadema leaders claimed that they were organized nationwide (Kigaila, 2015; Slaa, 2015). 
However, my first-hand observation revealed that Chadema was often organizationally absent in 
the Central Zone, especially in Singida and Dodoma. For example, Kigaila said that Dodoma Town 
was Chadema’s organizational strong-point in the region (Kigaila, 2015a). However, in Dodoma 
City, Chadema had few branches; by attending opening ceremonies, I witnessed that it was literally 
opening branches a month before the 2015 election (Fieldnotes, 2015g; Anonymous, 2015k). 
Likewise, in Iramba District (Singida Region) Chadema reported 30 functioning branches out of a 
possible 50 (Anonymous, 2015s). However, at Chadema rallies in Iramba, I observed on three 
occasions that no local activists aided rally-production (Paget, 2020). Their absence suggests that 
there may have been fewer branches in practice (Fieldnotes, 2015i; Fieldnotes, 2015j).  
 
In this section, I have empirically demonstrated that Chadema organized primarily through two 
modes of party-building between 2007 and 2015: organizing by touring leaders and organizing by 
branches. I developed these two concepts by distilling the processes which I have described above. 
By placing them in context, I have enriched them empirically and drawn out some idiosyncrasies, 
which in the name of abstraction, I omitted in my prior conceptual rendering. These modes of 
organizing were conceptually distinct. However, they are also interrelated. Organizing by party 
leaders engendered the establishment of branches, which subsequently went about establishing 
further branches. In effect, organizing by touring leaders multiplied the organizing by branches. 
Lastly, consistent with the literature, I have shown that Chadema focused organizing by touring 
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leaders and branches in receptive areas. This serves as a foil against which I contrast my study of 
deviant party organizing in the Central Zone, which I turn to in the next section. 
 
Beyond the frontier 
 
In Singida East,9 Chadema used to have almost no organizational presence at all. Chadema Central 
Committee member Tundu Lissu, who won Singida East in 2010 and 2015, recalled “There was 
no Chadema in Singida then [2008]. There were no branches, there was no leadership, there was 
nothing…” (Lissu, 2015). In seven years, this changed. Lissu said in 2015 that “We are 
everywhere…You wouldn’t go to a village in which there is no Chadema branch chairman and 
secretary” (Lissu, 2015). Other Chadema activists in Singida East affirmed this characterization. 
One recalled that in 2010: 
Previously, there were some wards you would have found that there is no 
branch leadership but now in most of the wards you will find that branch and 
foundation leadership exists (Anonymous, 2015o). 
They went on to report that Chadema had 50 foundations across the district, complemented by 
an advanced district-level campaign infrastructure (Anonymous, 2015o). These claims were 
corroborated by my site-visits, where I witnessed activists producing rallies (Fieldnotes, 2015h). 
Michaela Collord (2015) provides corroboratory evidence that Chadema organized widely in 
Singida East. 
 
Singida East was a particularly hostile environment in which for Chadema to organize. The 
demographics were against Chadema. Compared to the Tanzanian mean, radio penetration was 
low, educational attainment was low, and population-density was low (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2012). Meanwhile, CCM was well-organized (Anonymous, 2015f). Chadema organized 
in Singida East through the personalized methods that Lissu employed. Without his efforts, 
Chadema would have not achieved this organizational presence. Lissu’s organizing in Singida East 
is an exemplary case of a mode of organizing by concentrating leaders found in several 
constituencies in the Central Zone and beyond. I interviewed Lissu formally in 2015, spoke with 
him informally on three further occasions, made two extended visits to his constituency during the 
2015 campaign, and saw him address three separate rallies, two of which were in Singida. I draw 
on this evidence below. 
 
Lissu said he set out with the following objective: to “literally build the party from the ground” 
(Lissu, 2015). He recalled that “From January 2008 I was on the campaign trail, and I did not stop 
until 31st October 2010” (Lissu, 2015). His method was to arrive, often unannounced; improvise 
a meeting; address the public; and recruit party members. Lissu described that “The first few 
months [we] were doing everything. You broadcast the meetings. You get the chairs” (Lissu, 2015). 
Opposition leaders struggle to draw audiences. I witnessed another charismatic Chadema leader 
repeatedly fail to gather crowds (Fieldnotes, 2015j). Lissu said he overcame these challenges with 
persistence. 
 
9 First in Singida Rural District, later Ikungi District. 
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I gave myself a timetable that allowed me to be in Singida for two weeks every 
month... So it is meeting from village after village after village after village. 
Finish all the villages. Start all over again (Lissu, 2015). 
Therefore, his methods were iterative. He clarified that by 2010, “I had been in every village at 
least three times.” (Lissu, 2015) Lissu believed that this repetition was crucial. He described that 
“perceptibly, things started to change, gradually... The message started sinking. People started 
joining [the party]” (Lissu, 2015). Lissu also mitigated this problem by going “to places where there 
were people. I went to drink places. I went to market places” (Lissu, 2015). I saw other Chadema 
parliamentary candidates using this method (Fieldnotes, 2015i; Fieldnotes, 2015e). They explained 
that they went to markets and bars “to find a place where people will gather easily” (Mkisi, 2015). 
 
His descriptions make clear that his meeting involved personalized communication. He said “Our 
meetings have always been massive learning classes, they are political literacy classes. We argue 
these issues. They ask questions” (Lissu, 2015). These didactic and dialogic elements make his 
communication tailored and interactive respectively as defined above. Indeed, Lissu clarified that 
his method was persuasive; he said that “[I] argued my case in front of the people” and elaborated 
that “The political argument you win by articulating issues” (Lissu, 2015). Altogether, Lissu testifies 
that he organized in Singida East by using personalized methods of communication to convince 
people to become party activists. 
 
The case of Singida East might have been idiosyncratic. Lissu is a leading politician in Chadema. 
In fact, in 2020, he became its presidential candidate. Therefore, his mode of organizing might 
have little relation to Chadema organizing elsewhere. However, I followed Chadema’s 
parliamentary candidate for Kwimba constituency in 2015, Babila Shilogela, who had organized in 
a similar way. Geographically, Kwimba District falls beyond the Central Zone. It lies on the South-
Eastern tip of Mwanza Region. However, while Kwimba was nominally in the Victoria Zone, in 
2010 it displayed many typical features of the Central Zone. It has low education, radio penetration 
and population density (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). It is relatively remote from urban 
centers. A Chadema official admitted that Chadema had struggled to organize there (Anonymous, 
2015p). Another attributed this to its remoteness (Anonymous, 2015e). 
 
Much of the organizational progress that Chadema made between 2010 and 2015 was driven by 
Shilogela. He said that “I did M4C. I was in charge of M4C for the district” (Shilogela, 2015a). 
Like Lissu, Shilogela started far in advance of the election. A Chadema ward official recalled that 
Shilogela began to organize the party from 2010 to 2012. Shilogela told me that “I was moving 
around the district” (Shilogela, 2015a). A ward official corroborated that Shilogela “visited the 
whole of Kwimba” (Anonymous, 2015r). He returned in 2013 and continued until 2015. His 
method closely approximated Lissu’s, and, he told me, primarily involved a succession of small 
rallies (Shilogela, 2015a). A Chadema ward chairperson described that “This young man…travels 
by vehicle and he is in charge of the Public Address System and calls the people, he also talks to 
them” (Anonymous, 2015j). In other words, he held successive small rallies, which by virtue of 
their smalless, were interactive and individualized as defined above. 
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Like Lissu, Shilogela also placed iterative, incremental persuasion at the heart of this strategy. A 
Chadema ward official explained that he joined Chadema “Because I impressed by the good 
policies of the party, the performance, and its goals…Chadema has enlightened us” (Anonymous, 
2015r). He said that Shilogela “has been telling us that we need to change the mind-sets of people 
first and then slowly we shall be instilling the spirit of change as we go along” (Anonymous, 2015r). 
Shilogela’s organizing was intended to recruit members. The official said “Through volunteering 
and sacrificing our time we have managed to raise the number of members at ward level” 
(Anonymous, 2015r). 
 
Shilogela also contributed his personal resources to facilitate the recruitment of members and the 
organization of party organs. He bought party cards and core party equipment and distributed 
them across the constituency. He provided the vehicle and paid for fuel (Shilogela, 2015b). 
Another Chadema ward official remarked that “really Shilogela has done a lot” (Anonymous, 
2015a). I encountered several party activists who had been drawn to Chadema by Shilogela’s 
persuasion specifically (Anonymous, 2015r). The same official told me that he joined Chadema 
because “he [Shilogela] once addressed the rally during the M4C campaign and I was attracted by 
his preaching” (Anonymous, 2015a). I witnessed a Shilogela campaign rally and witnessed the 
effect of his oratory first-hand (Fieldnotes, 2015l). 
 
By the election in 2015, a CCM official judged that Chadema’s party-building remained incomplete 
in three wards (Anonymous, 2015w). However, a ward chairperson reported that Chadema had 
branch chairpersons in 60 villages (Anonymous, 2015j). Shilogela was commonly attributed the 
credit for this organizational expansion. The same ward chairperson said “I thank this young man, 
he has helped us with our visits across the district. He has really been helpful” (Anonymous, 2015j). 
 
Overall, Chadema organized less in Kwimba than Singida East, and the organizational 
improvement is less surprising, given that Kwimba is within Mwanza’s regional orbit. Nonetheless, 
the evidence of Shilogela’s party-building practices suggests that Chadema organized in Kwimba 
through Shilogela’s personalized organizing. This similarity between Lissu and Shilogela’s party-
building practices is important. It suggests that the case of Singida East is not peculiar, but 
emblematic of a mode of party-building. 
 
Indeed, the external validity of the practices drawn from these cases to the rest of Tanzania, and 
the concepts developed from them are further strengthened by Central Zone shadow cases. In 
Mlimba Constituency (Morogoro Region), Susan Kiwanga organized Chadema. She recalled that 
in 2010, “There was a structure but not a big structure” (Kiwanga, 2015), but that “today [2015] 
there is a village chairperson in every village” (Kiwanga, 2015). She won the seat that year. She told 
me that between 2011 and 2015, she endeavored to “form leaders at the grass roots” (Kiwanga, 
2015). She explained that  “In each village, I do meetings, rallies - and underground meetings” 
(Kiwanga, 2015). She explained that through these meetings, she reached out to different sets of 
citizens. Underground meetings were focused on party activists in particular. (Kiwanga, 2015). 
“Meetings” were small group conversations. “Some people come to our rallies, and some people 
they stay at home, so then you hold meetings to speak to those other people” (Kiwanga, 2015). 
These meetings and underground meetings feature the smallness which is typical of personalized 
communication as defined above. 




Similarly, Kigaila, described above, adopted similar organizational methods in Dodoma Town 
(Kigaila, 2015b). He convened closed-door meetings where he met with small groups and 
persuaded them to become party activists (Kigaila, 2015b). I accompanied him to one such meeting 
(Fieldnotes 2015k). They had been invited by Kigaila and one of his party activists. The meeting 
was long, and like Lissu’s meeting, it was dialogic. Kigaila spoke for 30 minutes, and then he 
engaged in an unscripted conversation with the attendees for over 90 further minutes, which was 
evidently interactive and individualized (Fieldnotes, 2015k). Kigaila told me that this was the third 
meeting with this group (Fieldnotes, 2015k). He and others explained that they had made only 
partial progress by 2015 because they had only recently started (Anonymous, 2015l; Anonymous, 




These four cases were all instances of Chadema organizing against the odds. The implication of 
the literature is that opposition parties do not organize in unreceptive areas, but in those 
constituencies, Chadema did. They illustrate what is possible; they show that opposition parties 
can organize in hostile terrain. I use these deviant cases to refine the literature. 
 
My starting-point is that party-building is under-theorized. The literature does not specify who 
organizes or how. Therefore, it insufficiently expresses the variety in party-building. I decompose 
opposition party-building into three modes. I generated these grounded categories through 
exploratory research in which I used site-intensive research to trace and construct practices. 
Thereby, I assure as much as possible the internal validity of my research. However, this case-
study research cannot to determine whether these categories capture the forms and variety of 
party-building practices elsewhere. Therefore, the external validity of these categories is for future 
research to explore. 
 
Nonetheless, there are tentative signs that opposition parties organize through modes of party-
building which approximate those developed here. For example, the Zambian opposition leader 
initiated an out-of-campaign season rally tour in 2008 (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2009, p. 22). 
Eight years later, another Zambian opposition leader followed suit (Beardsworth, 2020). In 
Burkina Faso, an opposition party, organized rapidly by delegating party-building to aspiring 
parliamentary candidates in a manner which closely resembles lone-organizing (Bertrand, 2019). 
 
By distinguishing between modes of party-building, I explain how Chadema organized in the 
Central Zone. Opposition parties organize in hostile areas through personalized communication 
by lone organizers. These leaders concentrate their efforts on building the party in one place, 
meeting the labor demands of personalized communication through the commitment of extensive 
personal time. They lighten those demands through the application of their personal resources and 
persuasive abilities. This explains how and through whom opposition parties organize in hostile 
environments. However, it does not explain what causes opposition parties to do so. Nor does it 
verify the effectiveness of these methods. These questions fall beyond the scope of the paper. 
They are gaps which future research might seek to fill.  
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